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Abstract This paper is based on linked qualitative
studies of the donation of human embryos to stem cell
research carried out in theUnited Kingdom, Switzerland,
and China. All three studies used semi-structured inter-
view protocols to allow an in-depth examination of
donors’ and non-donors’ rationales for their donation
decisions, with the aim of gaining information on con-
textual and other factors that play a role in donor deci-
sions and identifying how these relate to factors that are
more usually included in evaluations made by theoretical
ethics. Our findings have implications for one factor that
has previously been suggested as being of ethical con-
cern: the role of gratitude. Our empirical work shows no
evidence that interpersonal gratitude is an important
factor, but it does support the existence of a solidarity-
based desire to “give something back” to medical
research. Thus, we use empirical data to expand and
refine the conceptual basis of bioethically theorizing
the IVF–stem cell interface.
Keywords Embryo research . Embryo donation .
Human embryonic stem cells . In vitro fertilisation
(IVF) . Assisted reproductive technologies (ART)
Embryo Donation as a Sociomoral Practice
Embryos generated through assisted reproductive
technologies (ART) are deemed surplus when, for
some reason, they are not used for reproductive pur-
poses (Svendsen and Koch 2008; Haimes and Taylor
2011); instead, they are then disposed of or, where this
is allowed by a country’s ART regulation, may be
donated for a variety of research purposes. Thus, the
generation and subsequent fate of embryos that are
designated surplus are determined as much by legisla-
tion as by embryo biology or technological con-
straints. For example, legislatures differ in whether
cryopreservation of embryos is permitted, meaning
that in some countries any IVF embryos not immedi-
ately transferred for pregnancy are surplus, while in
others they may be frozen for later transfer. In some
countries, the law considers surplus embryos as the
primary source of material for human embryonic stem
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cell (hESC) research, while in others this use of em-
bryos is expressly forbidden.
Although hESC research has been subjected to
exhaustive ethical scrutiny, the lack of consensus on
the ontological or ethical status of surplus embryos
means that the uses to which they may then be put
remain contested (Deckers 2007; Guenin 2008; Moller
2009). Even if using human embryos for stem cell
research is deemed permissible, ethical issues continue
to emerge as new social practices and roles develop
around the act of embryo donation. The relative nov-
elty of these practices and roles, complicated by the
pace of change in technical possibility and regulation,
mean that there is still uncertainty about how to con-
ceptualise embryo donation, not just in terms of sys-
tematic ethics but as a sociomoral practice in everyday
social life and morality (Banks, Scully, and Shakespeare
2006). From a sociological perspective, and also to
understand more generally how everyday morality
deals with unprecedented ethical dilemmas, it is
important to examine which conceptualisations
emerge as salient and how they are stabilised and
used. For example, one way of thinking about the
donation of embryos to research is as a bodily gift
relationship, one of the many established by mod-
ern biomedicine such as the donation of eggs and
sperm for reproductive purposes, organs or tissues
for transplantation, blood for transfusion, and other
biological tissues for research. Drawing analogies
to existing practices in this way has proved helpful
in other instances of bioethical novelty (Hofmann,
Solbakk, and Holm 2006). However, analogies can
equally well be misleading, if there are morally relevant
but unacknowledged differences between situations.
The contexts in which different organs and tissues are
donated vary significantly, and these differences influ-
ence the sociomoral understanding of donation in each
case and make them noncomparable in ethical terms.
Reproductive tissue, for example, is generally distin-
guished from other types of donated tissue because
eggs, sperm, and embryos have the potential to give rise
to new individuals, not just to prolong the lives of
existing individuals, or to be used for research. Because
embryos are generally considered to have a different
moral status from other tissues, the use of surplus em-
bryos in research raises moral unease about the instru-
mentalization of human life that is not raised in quite the
same way by the donation of either ova or sperm. It is
therefore unclear whether an embryo can meaningfully
be treated as a “gift” (“donation”) without blurring the
morally relevant differences between embryos and other
tissues. Similarly, “hESC research,” to which the em-
bryo may be given, is a domain of biomedical practices
and not an entity. As such, hESC research is not a
subject with which a gift relationship can be established
(unlike, for instance, an organ recipient).
Empirical Exploration of Donation Decisions
Understanding the social and ethical meanings that are
emerging for the practices associated with embryo
donation calls for a detailed empirical examination of
people’s reasoning behind donation decisions. How-
ever, most empirical studies of embryo donation have
not focused on people’s donation rationales in depth
(with some exceptions; for example, Haimes et al.
2008; De Lacey 2003). The scarcity of data on donor
rationales means there is a corresponding lack of in-
formation on contextual and other factors that influ-
ence donor decisions and how these can be related to
the evaluations of theoretical ethics.
The authors of this paper have been involved in a
series of linked qualitative studies of practices of em-
bryo donation, first in the United Kingdom (researcher
Haimes and colleagues), then Switzerland (Scully,
Rehmann-Sutter, and Porz), and in a smaller pilot
project in China (Mitzkat, Rehmann-Sutter, and
Haimes). All three studies shared an interest in under-
standing reasons for the donation or non-donation of
embryos. While the studies in Switzerland and China
drew upon the original U.K. design, each study was
conducted independently, and the details of each proj-
ect, including interview design, differed in light of the
varying regulatory, clinical, and cultural contexts.
However, by looking across the three data sets, we
hope to gain cross-cultural insights into donation and
non-donation rationales and the moral understandings
on which they are based. The three studies all used
open-ended, semi-structured, one-off interviews be-
tween the researcher and people who had been in the
position of deciding whether to donate their surplus
embryos to research. Interviews were designed to ex-
plore in depth not just the interviewees’ decision about
donation but also the background to that decision,
such as their IVF story, their family and other relation-
ships, their relationship with the clinic and its staff,
and so on.
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The interviews were transcribed, coded, and ini-
tially analysed to identify the reasons for donation
decisions given by participants in each study, using
an interpretative approach that all of us have previ-
ously found useful for identifying key themes around
decision-making and implicit or explicit ethical judge-
ments (Charmaz 2006; Smith, Flowers, and Larkin
2009). The U.K. study ran for more than three years;
after some familiarisation and observation in the collab-
orating clinic, 44 in-depth interviews were conducted
with couples who had been asked to donate their surplus
fresh embryos, generated through ongoing IVF treat-
ment, to hESC research (Haimes and Taylor 2009). In
the United Kingdom, it has been possible for some years
to donate unused embryos to stem cell and other kinds
of research and also to other couples. The Swiss study
was carried out shortly after a change in the law that
permitted fresh or cryopreserved surplus IVF embryos,
under strictly defined conditions, to be donated to stem
cell research only. In this study, 17 individuals who had
variously chosen to donate or not to donate were inter-
viewed; thus, the decision concerned the fate of cryo-
preserved embryos some time after the IVF treatment
that had produced them (Scully, Rehmann-Sutter, and
Porz 2010). The Chinese work involved a much smaller
three-month pilot study carried out in a large ART
hospital. It was designed as a pilot to provide a compar-
ison with the U.K. and Swiss material and is, therefore,
included here despite the low number of participants,
but with no attempt to draw general conclusions from it.
Legislation in China does not allow the donation of
embryos to other couples, but consent can be given for
a surplus embryo to be used in stem cell research or for it
to be discarded. The study included participant obser-
vation of the information and consent procedures and
qualitative interviews with five IVF patients, three
choosing to donate to stem cell research and two refus-
ing (Mitzkat, Haimes, and Rehmann-Sutter 2010). All
three studies were approved by the relevant local
ethics committees. For the purposes of this paper,
the authors involved in the studies jointly compared
the rationales for donation decisions given by their
participants. We also independently reexamined inter-
view transcripts for material relevant to the discus-
sion of gratitude.
In the rest of this paper, we first identify and com-
pare the main reasons given by participants in these
three studies for their decisions to donate or to refuse
to donate their surplus embryos to research. We then
look in more detail at the implications of our findings
for one area of potential ethical concern: the possible
role of gratitude in making embryo disposition deci-
sions. In this way, we not only collect empirical data to
help understand the emerging moral meaning of a new
practice, but also give an example to show how em-
pirical data can be used to question and then refine the
conceptual basis of bioethical theory.
Reasons for Donating
Participants who chose to donate their surplus embry-
os to research had a background premise that donation
is fundamentally permissible because embryos do not
have the sort of ontological or moral status that would
forbid it. The Swiss study discovered people stating
this explicitly: “[Embryos] are not, they are not yet
people; they aren’t beings with souls as far as I’m
concerned,” as one Swiss participant said.1 But this
did not mean that the surplus embryos were considered
as morally equivalent to any other tissue, and partici-
pants in both the Swiss and U.K. studies stated reser-
vations about “simply throwing them out.” Several U.K.
interviewees stopped themselves midway through sen-
tences referring to the “left over embryos,” which they
clearly felt, on reflection, was an inappropriate phrase.
So the embryos did not have the sort of moral status that
would have made it wrong to donate them, but neither
were they completely disposable. To some of our par-
ticipants, embryos had a value; they were a precious
resource (Haimes et al. 2008) that made simply throw-
ing them out an unjustifiable waste. As another U.K.
interviewee put it: “I think it would have been a waste if
they’d just been destroyed … [I]t just really seemed a
waste, really, not to have them used.” It was not always
clear, however, quite how interviewees were using this
notion of “precious”: whether with reference to econom-
ic “bio-value” (Waldby 2000; Waldby and Mitchell
2006) or because they had been obtained at intense
personal and emotional cost, or because they had high
moral value, or possibly a combination of all these
aspects.
Particularly in the Swiss study, which involved
cryopreserved embryos stored for some time, participants
1 The three independent studies used different schemes to iden-
tify participants and quotes. To avoid confusion, all quotes are
identified here only by the study from which they came.
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referred to embryos’ moral status in a nuanced way that
was highly sensitive to the developmental stage of the
embryo, its physical location (whether inside or outside
the body), and its state (whether cryopreserved or not)
(see Scully, Rehmann-Sutter, and Porz 2010). Partici-
pants in the Swiss and U.K. studies seemed less
interested in explicitly defining “the” moral status of
an abstract embryo than working out what their own
particular embryos meant for them at defined points
in their own story, and what this meaning then indi-
cated it was morally permissible for them to do with
that embryo.
Contribution to Research
Across all three studies the commonest rationale for
opting to donate was a willingness to contribute to
potentially curative medical research. Such research
was seen as a valuable endeavour by those like the
Swiss participant who said, “I feel that, fundamentally,
research has to go on, and I support that.” Donation of
their spare embryos to research was therefore seen as a
morally good act, based on a kind of ethical arithmetic
in which simple disposal produced zero good from the
surplus embryo, while donation had the potential to do
good by supporting research. As one U.K. interviewee
said, “It was quite simply that ‘we’ve been helped by
the system, we should help the system back.’ … Not
because of some sort of martyrdom or heroics or
anything like that, just quite simply that without such
efforts things don’t progress.” In the U.K. study there
was an added imperative to donate surplus embryos to
research as there had been a lot of press coverage
about the hoped-for curative outcomes of stem cell
science: “I think the research is very important, like
it was in the news a while ago to say that [the Senior
Clinician] was successful in stem cell research and
that’s what you need in order to provide medical
assistance in the future, so I’m all for it.”
This observation raises a separate ethical concern
about the patients’ understanding of the information
they were given about the research goals. Here, there
were distinct differences between the three studies. In
the Swiss study, the notification from the clinic storing
the frozen embryos stated clearly that donation was to
stem cell research, yet the majority of donors we
interviewed who referred to research did so in terms
that were directly relevant to infertility. For instance,
one participant said, “A lot of preparatory work,
research work, went on before medicine was advanced
enough that it was possible for us to have children. …
[T]his is now maybe a tiny tiny contribution, that we
can give back, if we now donate a, er, fertilised egg,
perhaps for further research.” Note that in the Chinese
pilot study none of the participants spoke in precise
terms about the research involved; however, they de-
scribed it broadly as “scientific research… for the IVF
treatment.” One Chinese interviewee said she did not
really know what the research was about, but trusted
the doctors and hoped it would help other infertile
women. In Switzerland, the donors were former IVF
patients donating cryopreserved embryos; in China,
they were current IVF patients donating either fresh
or cryopreserved embryos. In neither of these studies
were participants asked outright if they thought their
donated embryo was being used in infertility research.
However, the fact that they used phrases such as
“helping others as we have been helped” (italics
added) indicates a potential misunderstanding. It raises
the possibility that if they had been fully aware that the
research undertaken with their embryos did not con-
cern infertility, participants might have chosen against
donation.
The U.K. participants had much clearer ideas about
the research to which they were being asked to donate;
they knew that it was not for research on fertility
issues. These participants, as in the Chinese study,
were current patients donating fresh embryos. The
differences in comprehension are therefore unlikely
to be due to the request context (former vs. current
patients or fresh vs. frozen embryos) in itself. Howev-
er, in the U.K. study participants were asked to decide
whether or not to donate to a number of specific
projects, for each of which the goal and methodology
was explained in detail, orally and in writing. It is
possible that this level of engagement with the detail
of the research underlies the difference. It will be
important to clarify this, and to identify best practices
for maximising patient comprehension of the research
goals, because if (as our material indicates) the type of
research to which people donate is a relevant factor in
their moral evaluation, then the question of whether
they fully understand its nature is ethically crucial.
Reparation
As we have seen, some of our participants reasoned
that if their embryo was not going to be used for
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pregnancy, then donating it to a good endeavour
(research) would be more meaningful than simply dis-
carding it. Notably in the Swiss interviews, however,
several participants went further. For example, one
interviewee said: “If we’ve created life that we, or I,
don’t want any more, then maybe it’s least sinful, or
however you want to put it, if something meaningful
happens to it.… I feel a little bit guilty sometimes, not
very much, but a little bit like… if we can at least give
these embryos for a good reason, then it wasn’t com-
pletely in vain.” Using similar wording, another said,
“If I’ve already gone a bit astray, and in a sense we’ve
produced life, erm, then at the very least something
meaningful should come out of it.”
Our interpretation of their statements is that they
felt they had (inadvertently) done something wrong in
“creating life” but then not using that life as intended
in pregnancy, and that donation to a good endeavour
would in some way make up for this wrong. (We want
to be quite clear here that we are not arguing that
failure to use an IVF embryo in pregnancy actually
is a moral wrong, only that some of our participants
said that in their case they felt so.) They did not
indicate that they felt their use of IVF in itself had
been wrong, but articulated the sense that in ending up
with surplus embryos they had done something less
than ideal. For these Swiss participants, then, their
donation decision appears to have been driven in part
by what we could call a reparative urge. No indication
of any similar reparative urge was observed in either
the U.K. or the Chinese interviews: we discuss this
difference further below.
Reasons Not to Donate
Approximately half of the Swiss participants who
were interviewed turned out to have decided against
donation and instead have their surplus cryopreserved
embryo(s) destroyed. None of these explicitly used the
moral status of the embryo as the fundamental basis
for rejecting donation to research. Rather, the most
common reason given was anxiety and mistrust about
what “the scientists” would do with their embryo,
which was articulated either as disapproval of specific
types of research (e.g., “not if it’s for cloning”) or as a
more general unwillingness to relinquish responsibil-
ity of the embryo to unknown others. In both sets of
reasoning, therefore, participants were expressing
unease about the loss of control over what would
happen to their embryo. The two Chinese interviewees
who had opted against donation also did so because of
reservations about lack of knowledge of exactly what
the embryos would be used for, explicitly mentioning
the fear that they would be donated to (i.e., used to
generate pregnancy in) other women. In addition, two
of the Swiss participants gave financial reasons, that
is, they expressed anger that they would not be com-
pensated for giving up their embryo and that through
donation researchers were “getting something for
nothing.” In the U.K. study, speculation about why
some people might refuse to donate raised concerns
about what might be done with the embryos and
whether a baby would be developed through experi-
mentation; others wondered if “refusers” were worried
that another infertile couple would receive their em-
bryos and have a baby when they, the embryo pro-
viders, failed to do so. The U.K. sample contained
only two actual refusers, who objected on the grounds
of possible use in animal research (Haimes and Taylor
2009; Hug 2008).
The Problem of Gratitude
These observations provide material for an empirically
grounded bioethics of the IVF–stem cell interface
(Franklin 2006). In the rest of this paper, we consider
a single aspect in detail: the potential “problem” of
gratitude influencing informed consent.
Empirically, the main reasons given by our partic-
ipants for donation were: (1) to avoid the waste of a
precious resource, (2) to give something back to re-
search, and (3) to compensate for a perceived moral
wrong. In none of the three countries did our partic-
ipants indicate that their decision arose out of any
sense of gratitude to the physician who had given them
IVF treatment. This is an important observation, be-
cause the possible impact of gratitude on informed
consent in embryo donation has previously been
raised by bioethical commentators. It has been sug-
gested that if there is any institutional or procedural
link between IVF treatment and hESC research, the
potential donors’ gratitude toward the clinicians who
have helped them to conceive may steer them toward
opting for donation (Haimes and Luce 2006; Parry
2006; McLeod and Baylis 2007; also discussed in
Roberts and Throsby 2008). The bioethical concern
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is that parents who receive the “gift of a baby” will
feel a sense of gratitude; feeling grateful might then
cause parents to feel that they should respond with a
gift in return; and if a request for donation of surplus
embryos is made in that context, potential donors
might inadvertently be encouraged to see donation as
an appropriate form of return gift. In this way the
moral emotion of gratitude could compromise the
potential donor’s freedom to weigh the pros and cons
of the request, which in turn means compromising the
capacity to give fully voluntary consent. Even where
the clinicians and researchers themselves are scrupu-
lous about not using persuasion, gratitude might be
persuading potential donors to do something they
would not otherwise choose to do.
To avoid this possibility, countries that allow em-
bryo donation for research may attempt a strict sepa-
ration of IVF treatment and the stem cell research
domain. (Not all legislatures do this, however: China
is one country that does not.) In the United Kingdom,
for example, it is accepted good practice that requests
for donation of spare embryos should not be made by
the physician(s) who delivered the original IVF treat-
ment. In Switzerland, a predominant interpretation of
the current law on embryo donation is that a couple
undergoing IVF treatment should not be told even of
the theoretical possibility that a surplus embryo might
be generated unless it actually is (Porz et al. 2008). By
setting up such physical and procedural barriers, reg-
ulators hope to rule out any conflict of interest on the
part of the treating physician as well as the possibility
of gratitude on the part of the patient. There are several
theoretical questions that can be asked about a claim
that the “risk” of gratitude affects potential donors’
decisions. For example, moral psychologists might
want to examine the emotional exceptionalism in
which gratitude is seen as potentially compromising,
while other emotions, or even the absence of emotion,
is not. There is also an obvious empirical question
which does not seem to have been closely examined:
whether potential embryo donors actually do experi-
ence a sense of personal gratitude to the physician—or
one strong enough to sway their donation decision.
Our findings suggest that they do not. However, they
do indicate that participants’ rationales for donation
indicate a desire to “give back” in a more complex
way.
First, our empirical results show the importance of
distinguishing between the three moral emotions of
gratitude, indebtedness, and solidarity. These three
terms have overlapping meanings. What we normally
mean by gratitude is an emotion primarily associated
with gifts or with help that is undeserved. Gratitude
has been defined as “a feeling of thankful appreciation
for favours received” (Guralnik 1971, 327) and is
experienced as a positive emotion. Watkins et al.
(2006) provide a basis from experimental psychology
for distinguishing between indebtedness and gratitude.
One important distinction is that “indebtedness is an
emotion of exchange, whereas gratitude is not”
(Watkins et al. 2006, 236). Even if a debt of gratitude
is felt, “it does not appear to be analogous to an
economic debt” (Watkins et al. 2006, 239). Indebted-
ness, however, is, literally, a debt: a “state of obliga-
tion to repay another” (Mauss 2001, 2). A further
feature associated with indebtedness but not with grat-
itude is the inherent imbalance of power, so that a
hierarchy is created in which those who are indebted
are rendered more vulnerable. The empirical social
psychological work of Watkins et al. indicates that,
in experimental settings at least, a person’s feelings of
gratitude diminish as the expectation of return (indebt-
edness) increases. The more reciprocity is expected or
demanded, the more indebted and the less grateful a
beneficiary feels. Importantly for considering the
effects of these social emotions on donation decisions,
Watkins et al. found that the greater the expectation
that something will be given back in return, the less
motivated the participants were actually to comply
with the norm of reciprocity (Watkins et al. 2006,
236). These results suggest that if patients were to
sense any expectation of return by an individual phy-
sician or researcher, it would if anything lessen any
gratitude they might have felt.
In the IVF context, what people have received (the
thing for which they might feel grateful) is their baby
or pregnancy, or at the very least, treatment. Donors
who achieve this have not received a gift, but a med-
ical service, which will have been paid for in one way
or another. In Switzerland, where IVF is not covered
by the mandatory health insurance, this will often be
direct payment from the patients to the clinic, as it will
also often be in China. In the United Kingdom,
patients who do not already have children commonly
receive two “free” cycles of NHS treatment (paid for
through taxes on the population), and then they pay for
future cycles directly through fees to the clinics. What-
ever the system of payment, however, the point is that
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the IVF physician or clinic has already been paid,
directly or indirectly, for the treatment which produced
the outcome. So in the case of embryo donation, it
could be argued that neither gratitude nor indebtedness
should be anticipated. Gratitude would not be
expected, because what patients have received was
not a favour or unexpected gift; and indebtedness
would not be expected, because there is no debt if
payment has already been made.
In our three studies, although we found apprecia-
tion and high esteem were expressed for the work of
the treating hospital or team, we found no evidence of
gratitude being expressed toward an individual physi-
cian. This is despite the fact that in both the United
Kingdom and China mention was made of the well-
known head physicians who led each clinic; the men-
tions were in appreciation of their reputations, not as a
debt of gratitude. Participants wanted to do something
with the surplus embryo that would be of benefit to
research and medical treatment for infertility, but this
was not directly associated with the physician who
provided it originally. Indeed, some of our interview-
ees were critical of aspects of their own IVF treatment,
while still wanting to support the infertility research
enterprise overall. In this context, it should be remem-
bered that about half the Swiss participants inter-
viewed in fact chose not to donate, primarily out of
anxiety about losing control over the fate of their
embryos, but also in some cases because it meant
researchers were “getting something for nothing.”
Similarly, in the U.K. study, a few patients were sus-
picious that research was being prioritised over treat-
ment and that embryos might have been kept back for
the research rather than frozen. Although only a small
number of participants expressed this view, it has
particular relevance here as it indicates clearly the
absence of either gratitude or indebtedness: indeed, it
suggests that these participants felt that, if anything,
donation would mean the researchers were receiving
something beyond their entitlement or were indebted
to the patients rather than the reverse.
Social exchanges may entail giving back not to an
individual, because the individual may be unknowable
or because the benefit may not have come from a
single identifiable person, but to “the pattern of social
life” (Becker 1986)—for example, giving back to the
institutional biomedical research that had helped the
participants. In serial reciprocity, person A receives
something from person B, but pays back not to person
B but to some other third party (Moody 2008). Serial
reciprocity accounts for the way that altruistic blood
donors often do describe their action in terms of reci-
procity, even though they have not received anything
from the person to whom their blood eventually goes.
What drives serial reciprocity is not gratitude or indebt-
edness to an individual or an organisation but a sense of
solidarity with unknown others in the community.
In the case of embryo donation, what appears to be
a directly reciprocal act of gratitude—a surplus em-
bryo in return for treatment—may thus be understood
as something quite different. Participants in our stud-
ies used a rationale for donation based not on recipro-
cal exchange between individuals, but on “giving back
to” a research enterprise from which they had benefited
and which they hoped would benefit unknown others
in the future. For the Swiss and Chinese donors who
choose to donate because they think they are support-
ing infertility research, these unknown others are not
completely anonymous: they are “known” because of
imaginatively shared experience. “Giving something
back” to the research that had helped them (as they
think they are doing) was not considered an obligation
but, rather, a form of return that was meaningful and
seemed especially fitting to them because of the expe-
riences they had gone through. In the U.K. study,
although there was greater clarity about the purpose
of the research being contributed to, there was still a
sense among embryo providers that they were benefit-
ing from the fact that others had participated in re-
search in the past which had improved IVF; they
were clear in expressing solidarity with this imagined
community of previous IVF research contributors by
making their own contributions to research, albeit re-
search in another domain.
At least some of our participants, then, also see
their donation to research as an indirect way of passing
on the benefit they have received from research to
someone else, whose situation in some way resembles
their own. The social meaning of this indirect reci-
procity is neither gratitude nor indebtedness, but soli-
darity with other present and future patients.
Concluding Comments on Reparation, Solidarity,
and Consent
To summarise: Our interpretation of the material sug-
gests that donors’ reasons for donating were not
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connected in any straightforward way to either grati-
tude or indebtedness. For some people the desire not
to waste a valuable (in more than one sense) resource
is foremost. A generally positive stance toward
biomedical science means that donation is a good
use of a valuable resource. With some of the Swiss
participants, we also identified a reparative urge
coming from a sense of moral unease, and here
donation seems to offer a route through which the
urge to make reparation can be satisfied. All of this
suggests that neither gratitude nor indebtedness per
se are present in decision-making at the IVF–stem
cell interface, at least not in terms of undue induce-
ment or of compromising the capacity for informed
consent.
But this analysis leaves some difficult ethical issues
still to be considered. The reparative urge foregrounds
a different set of ethical questions about the socio-
moral meaning of the generation of spare embryos
and the act of donation. For example, the perceived
need for reparation that appears to drive some of the
Swiss participants’ donation choices arises because
people felt some sense of wrongdoing at creating
embryos that are not used for pregnancy. The spirit
of the Swiss legal framework strongly reinforces the
sense that the occurrence of embryos not used for
pregnancy is to be considered as wrong. From this
point of view, one possible conclusion could be that
the felt desire for reparation is in fact an ethically
appropriate response: if the act of deliberately creating
an embryo is a morally significant one, which needs to
be justified by the good of its intended outcome (preg-
nancy), then not using it for the purpose that justifies it
does indeed present a genuine ethical difficulty. On the
other hand, the novelty of surplus embryos in the
Swiss legal and social context (Scully and Rehmann-
Sutter 2006) meant that many patients would have
been unaware at the time of their IVF of the possibility
of generating a surplus embryo. Moreover, in most
cases there were perfectly valid clinical or legal rea-
sons why the embryos could not be transferred, which
fully justified the failure to use them as originally
intended. That these factors were not in the partici-
pants’ control arguably means there is less reason for a
sense of wrongdoing. The Swiss participants were
quite aware of the valid reasons why their embryos
could not be transferred, and yet some of them still
said that they had fallen short of some moral standard.
We suggest that this persistent unease (which does not
appear so prevalent in the U.K. material) in part
reflects Switzerland’s prevailing sociocultural norms
about ART. These are captured in Swiss legislation’s
highly defensive attitude toward embryos in general
and the generation of surplus embryos in particular.
Swiss law operates from the presumption that a sur-
plus embryo is an exceptional event that will happen
only through the failure of regulation and practice
specifically set up to prevent it (Porz et al. 2008). In
addition, as we discussed earlier, the generation of
surplus embryos is still an unfamiliar social practice
and the role of the embryo donor is one that lacks
widespread cultural recognition. In the Swiss context
of legal exceptionalism, then, producing one of these
culturally unfamiliar entities may more readily be
understood as something “wrong” for which repara-
tion is in order. In the more permissive cultural and
legislative context of the United Kingdom, although
some interviewees expressed guilt about other aspects
of the process (for example, inappropriate styles of
speech about embryos), there was no sense that not
using the embryos as intended in itself constituted a
moral failing. If our interpretation is correct, as the
creation of surplus embryos becomes normalised in
Swiss society and the role of embryo donor becomes
normalised in both the U.K. and Swiss (and other)
societies, there will be a shift in ideas about the moral
meaning of surplus embryos, and this should be em-
pirically testable.
For the majority of the participants in Switzerland
and the United Kingdom who chose to donate their
surplus embryos, donation decisions were not driven
by a reparative urge but by the feeling that donation
expressed solidarity with research and/or other
patients. What our empirical work shows is that grat-
itude to an individual must be distinguished from a
solidarity-based desire to “give something back” to
medical research. However, this does not necessarily
mean that solidarity-based reciprocity has no relevant
impact on the capacity for voluntary consent. One
possible consequence, for example, is that if potential
donors feel solidarity with the research enterprise, or
with present and future patients, then they might also
experience an obligation to support it. However, in all
three studies there were people who chose not to
donate (about half of the Swiss interviewees did not
donate, while in the United Kingdom approximately
46 percent of those asked have been shown to opt
against donation [Choudhary et al. 2004]), which
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suggests either that there is no sense of obligation, or
that it is neither universal nor irresistible.
There is a second problem if solidarity-based reci-
procity is taken as something to be prevented. If there
is a risk that gratitude felt by an individual could
influence donation decisions, then the risk can be
minimised by separating IVF and stem cell research
physically and procedurally, as bioethicists have sug-
gested and some clinics and guidelines have imple-
mented. But if instead there is a desire to benefit
research or to show solidarity with collective “others”
rather than an individual, then what sort of physical or
procedural barriers could be set up to prevent it having
an influence? There are further theoretical questions to
be explored here about the assumption that contextual
emotions such as gratitude or solidarity compromise
the decision to donate. The situation in which donation
of a surplus embryo is a possibility comes about as a
result of a variety of social, cultural, political, legal,
and emotional features that combine to make the situ-
ation what it is. It will be important to identify care-
fully the features that are constitutive of the situation
of having a surplus embryo (including a sense of
solidarity to similar others, emotional bonds with the
embryo that change over time, regret over the failure
to use all embryos for pregnancy, and so on) and to
consider whether these constitutive features can or
should also be treated as factors that compromise the
responsible, autonomous decision-making capacity of
the people involved. This introduces the question of
the extent to which any decision to donate can be
detached from its context and the contextual factors
that shape how people respond to donation requests.
Finally, we should not forget that the possibility
that some donors misunderstand the kind of research
they are donating to raises some ethical difficulty. It
means that donors may be deciding for donation out of
a misplaced sense of solidarity—a different ethical
problem.
The deliberative processes of the donor participants
in our three studies incorporated their appreciation of
the particular moral value of their own embryos and of
the value of biomedical research. These deliberations
are complex, and the participants’ own dependency on
pre-existing medical research and their affiliation with
others in similar situations must be recognised, we
suggest, in order to understand how they might con-
figure donation as a means to cope with the moral
ambivalence of the situation in which they find
themselves. Their decisions are not driven by some
unacknowledged sense of debt, but rather are respon-
sive to the emerging social and moral reality of em-
bryo donation in the first decade of the 21st century.
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